Safety incentive programmes have their intended effect: a reduction in the loss due to accidents. They also have positive side-effects. For one thing, they are a profitable proposition in industry, as the savings usually exceed the costs. For another, they may lead to better company morale. Incentive programmes can help improve the general organizational climate and, therefore, make a positive contribution to productivity over and above the gain due to accident reduction. Group-based safety incentive programmes give workers a common cause with each other as well as with management. Reinforcing safe acts “removes the unwanted side effects with discipline and the use of penalties; it increases the employees’ job satisfaction; it enhances the relationship between the supervisor and employees” (McAfee and Winn 1989).

Cost-Effectiveness of Incentive Programmes

There have been many cases, in manufacturing, construction and other industries, in which the accident rate per employee was reduced by 50 to 80%. Sometimes the results are better still, as was the case in two mining companies in which the total lost days dropped by 89 and 98% respectively (Fox, Hopkins and Anger 1987). Sometimes the results are more modest. A cable plant reduced the accident costs per employee by 35%; a manufacturer of tobacco products by 31% (Stratton 1988); a grain processing and transportation company by 30%; a Pacific resort complex by 39%, and a manufacturer of food products by 10% (Bruening 1989).

These favourable effects continue to last over long periods of time. Incentive plans in two American mines were studied over periods of 11 and 12 years. In one mine the number of days lost due to accidents was reduced to about 11% of baseline and in another to about 2%. Benefit/cost ratios varied from year to year between 18 and 28 at one mine and between 13 and 21 at the other. There was no sign that the effectiveness of the incentive plans diminished over time at either mine (Fox et al. 1987). A high benefit/cost ratio—about 23 to 1—has also been observed for incentives for safety in the resort hotel business.

The ratios between benefits (savings due to accidents prevented) and programme costs (bonuses and administration) are usually greater than 2 to 1, meaning that companies can make money on such accident-prevention efforts. This is largely due to reduced fees to workers’ compensation boards and other insurance, as well as to increased production, reduced downtime and a lesser need for replacement workers.

Requirements for Effective Incentive Programming

Incentive programmes, when properly designed, carry the approval of the people to whom they are addressed, and in this respect they compare favourably with the other forms of safety motivation such as laws, rule books and policing, which are much less popular. To put it plainly: a small carrot is not only much better liked than a big stick, it is also much more effective. Only one negative side-effect has been noticed so far, and that is the tendency of people to under-report accidents when incentive programmes are in effect. Fortunately, such under-reporting has been found to occur with respect to minor accidents only (McAfee and Winn 1989).

Past experience with incentive programmes also shows that some programmes have had much greater effect than others. For instance, a German incentive plan which promised professional truck and van drivers a bonus of DM 350 for each half-year of driving without being at fault in an accident, produced a reduction in direct accident cost to less than one-third in the first year of application and remained at that level for over three decades (Gros 1989). In the California “good driver” experiment, where drivers in the general population were offered free extension of their driver’s licence by one year in return for each year of accident-free driving, the accident rate dropped by 22% in the first year of the programme (Harano and Hubert 1974).

An attempt has been made here to cull the ingredients of the most effective incentive plans from published reports. This has by necessity largely been based on inference, because to date there are no well-controlled experiments in which one particular incentive characteristic is being varied and all other factors are kept constant. For obvious reasons, such experiments are not likely to be forthcoming; industry is not in the business of running such experiments. Never the less, the items that appear in the checklist below would seem to make very good sense (Wilde 1988; McAfee and Winn 1989; Peters 1991).

Managerial vigour

The introduction and long-term maintenance of incentive programmes should be conducted with managerial vigour, commitment and coherence. Workers or drivers should not only be informed of the programme in existence, but they should also frequently be reminded of it in attention-catching ways. In order to motivate and to inform the relevant audience, those in charge of incentive programmes should provide clear and frequent knowledge of results to the audience (Komaki, Barwick and Scott 1978).

Rewarding the “bottom line”

Incentive programmes should reward the outcome variable (the fact of not having caused an accident), not some process variable like wearing safety glasses or seat-belts, being sober or obeying shop-floor safety rules. This is because rewarding specific behaviours does not necessarily strengthen the motivation towards safety. A potential safety benefit due to an increased frequency of one specific form of “safe” behaviour may simply be offset by road users less frequently displaying other forms of “safe” acting. “The risk is here that while the rewarded behaviour may improve, other related safe behaviours may deteriorate” (McAfee and Winn 1989).

Attractiveness of the reward

Incentive programmes can be expected to be more successful to the extent that they widen the difference between the perceived benefit of not having an accident and the perceived disadvantage of having an accident. Rewards for accident-free operation in industry have taken many different forms, ranging from cash to public commendation. They include trading stamps, lottery tickets, gift certificates, shares of company stock, extra holidays, promotions and other privileges. While the flexible use of money prevents satiation from occurring, merchandise, especially customized merchandise, may constitute a lasting reminder of the value of safety. Merchandise items also have a “value-added” component in the sense that they can be obtained at a lower price than the recipients would likely have to pay if they bought the items at retail. In the United States, a substantial industry has sprung up to provide the merchandise for safety prizes. Gift certificates hold a middle ground between cash and merchandise; they can be put to flexible use and yet be personalized and imprinted with a commemorative message. Drivers have been rewarded with cash, automobile insurance rebates and free licence renewal.

Awards do not have to be large to be effective. In fact, a case can be made for relatively small recognition awards, such as 1- and 5-year safe driving pins, these being preferable in some cases. Small awards make it possible to hand out awards more frequently, they are probably less conducive to under-reporting of accidents, and they may foster the internalization of pro-safety attitudes through the process of cognitive dissonance reduction (Geller 1990). When a small reward changes a person’s behaviour, that person may justify the change by reasoning that the change was for safety’s sake rather than due to the insignificant inducement. No such internalization of pro-safety attitudes is necessary when the external inducement is large, because in that case it fully justifies the behaviour change.

It should be noted, however, that the attitude-shaping effect of modest awards can take place only after the operators have changed their behaviour for whatever minor external inducement. So, the award should be desirable enough to achieve some behaviour change to begin with. Rewards should have “perceived value” in the minds of the recipients. In some cases, a small material reward might imply a major social reward because of its “symbolic function”. Safe behaviour may thus become the “right thing to do”. This might help explain why a modest incentive such as free licence renewal for one year produced a major reduction in the accident rate of California drivers. Moreover, analogous to earlier studies that found that accident rates in dangerous tasks (such as piece-work) were exponentially related (to the power of three) to higher wages, it may be suggested that relatively small increments in wages for having no accidents should reduce the accident rate by a larger amount (Starr 1969).

Progressive safety credits

The amount of the incentive should continue to grow progressively as the individual operator accumulates a larger number of uninterrupted accident-free periods; for example, the bonus for ten uninterrupted years of accident-free operation should be greater than ten times the bonus for one year of accident-free performance.

Programme rules

The operational rules of the programme should be kept simple, so that they are easily understood by all persons to whom the programme applies. It is of paramount importance that the incentive programme should be developed in cooperation and consultation with those people to whom it will be applied. People are more likely to actually strive for goals they have helped define themselves (Latham and Baldes 1975).

Perceived equity

The incentive programme should be perceived as equitable by those to whom it is addressed. The bonus should be such that it is viewed as a just reward for not causing an accident in a given time period. Similarly, incentive systems should be designed such that those workers who are not eligible for the (top) award do not resent the system, and that those who are rewarded will be seen by others as justly receiving the award. As chance plays a part in having or not having an accident, the actual receipt of the award may be made dependent on the additional requirement that the accident-free worker in question also maintains cleanliness and safety in his or her workstation. In the event that disincentives are used as well, it is necessary that the public view the penalty imposed as justified.

Perceived attainability

Programmes should be designed such that the bonus is viewed as within potential reach. This is of particular importance if the bonus is awarded in a lottery system. Lotteries make it possible to hand out greater awards, and this may enhance the attention-getting appeal of an incentive programme, but fewer among the people who have accumulated the safety credit will receive the bonus. This, in turn, may discourage some people from making an active attempt to accumulate the safety credit to begin with.

Short incubation period

The specified time period in which the individual has to remain accident-free in order to be eligible for the bonus should be kept relatively short. Delayed rewards and penalties tend to be discounted and are thus less effective in shaping behaviour than more immediate consequences. Periods as short as one month have been used. If longer periods apply, then monthly reminders, status reports and similar materials should be used. In the California experiment cited above, those drivers whose licenses were coming up for renewal within 1 year after being informed of the incentive programme showed a greater reduction in accident rate than was true for people whose licenses were not to be renewed until two or three years later.

Rewarding group as well as individual performance

Incentive programmes should be designed to strengthen peer pressure towards having no accident. Thus, the plan should not only stimulate each individual operator’s concern for his or her own safety, but also motivate them to influence peers so that their accident likelihood is also reduced. In industrial settings this is achieved by extending a bonus for accident-free performance of the particular work team in addition to the bonus for individual freedom of accidents. Team bonuses increase the competitive motivation towards winning the team award. They also have been found effective in isolation—that is, in the absence of awards for individual performance. A dual bonus plan (individual cum team) can be further strengthened by informing families of the safety award programme, the safety goals and the potential rewards.

Prevention of accident under-reporting

Thought should be given to the question of how to counteract operators’ tendency not to report the accidents they have. The possibility that incentive programmes may stimulate this tendency seems to be the only currently identified negative side-effect of such programmes (while occasionally moral objections have been raised against rewarding people for obtaining a goal they should aspire to on their own, without being “bribed into safety”). Some incentive programmes have clauses providing for deduction of safety credits in case accidents are not reported (Fox et al. 1987). Fortunately, only those accidents that are minor remain unreported at times, but the greater the safety bonus, the more frequent this phenomenon may become.

Reward all levels of the organization

Not only are shop-floor workers to be rewarded for safe performance, but their supervisors and middle management as well. This creates a more cohesive and pervasive safety orientation within a company (thus shaping a “safety culture”).

Whether or not to supplement rewards with safety training

Although educating towards safety is different from motivating towards safety, and a person’s ability to be safe should be clearly distinguished from that person’s willingness to be safe, some authors in the field of incentives in industrial settings feel that it may be helpful to safety if workers are told through what specific behaviours accidents can be avoided (e.g., Peters 1991).

Maximizing net savings versus maximizing benefit/cost

In the planning of an incentive programme, thought should be given to the question of what actually constitutes its primary goal: the greatest possible accident reduction, or a maximal benefit/cost ratio. Some programmes may reduce the accident frequency only slightly, but achieve this at a very low cost. The benefit/cost ratio may thus be higher than is true for another programme where the ratio between benefits and costs is lower, but which is capable of reducing the accident rate by a much greater degree. As distinct from the issue of the size of the benefit/cost ratio, the total amount of money saved may well be much greater in the latter case. Consider the following example: Safety programme A can save $700,000 at an implementation cost of $200,000. Programme B can save $900,000 at a cost of $300,000. In terms of benefit/cost, A’s ratio is 3.5, while B’s ratio equals 3.0. Thus, judged by the benefit/cost criterion, A is superior, but if net savings are considered, the picture is different. While programme A saves $700,000 minus $200,000, or $500,000, programme B saves $900,000 minus $300,000, or $600,000. In terms of net savings, the larger programme is to be preferred.

Concluding Comment

Like any other accident countermeasure, an incentive plan should not be introduced without evaluating its short-term and long-term feasibility and its best possible form, nor without provision for scientifically adequate evaluation of its implementation costs and its observed effectiveness in reducing the accident rate. Without such research the surprising effect of one particular reward programme would never have come to light. Although there seems little chance for a safety incentive to actually have a negative effect, there is one variation of a series of California reward/incentive programmes for the general driving public that did produce worse driving records. In this particular programme component, a benefit was given to drivers with no accidents on their records without their prior knowledge of that benefit. It took the form of an unexpected reward rather than an incentive, and this highlights the importance of the distinction for safety promotion. The term incentive refers to a pre-announced gratification or bonus extended to workers or drivers on the specific condition that they do not have an accident of their own fault within a specified future time period.

Back

Give me a ladder that is twice as stable, and I will climb it twice as high. But give me a cause for caution, and I’ll be twice as shy. Consider the following scenario: A cigarette is invented that causes half the frequency of smoking-related deaths per cigarette smoked as compared to present-day cigarettes, but in all other ways it is indistinguishable. Does this constitute progress? When the new cigarette replaces the current one, given that there is no change in people’s desire to be healthy (and that this is the only factor inhibiting smoking), smokers will respond by smoking twice as much. Thus, although the death rate per cigarette smoked is cut in half, the death risk due to smoking remains the same per smoker. But this is not the only repercussion: the availability of the “safer” cigarette leads fewer people to stop smoking than presently is the case and seduces more current non-smokers to yield to the temptation to smoke. As a consequence, the smoking-related death rate in the population increases. However, as people are willing to take no more risks with their health and lives than they see fit in exchange for the satisfaction of other desires, they will cut down on other, less appealing, unsafe or unhealthy habits. The end result is that the lifestyle-dependent death rate remains essentially the same.

The above scenario illustrates the following basic premises of risk homeostasis theory (RHT) (Wilde 1988; 1994):

The first is the notion that people have a target level of risk—that is, the level of risk they accept, tolerate, prefer, desire or choose. The target level of risk depends on perceived benefits and disadvantages of safe and unsafe behaviour alternatives, and it determines the degree to which they will expose themselves to safety and health hazards.

The second premise is that the actual frequency of lifestyle-dependent death, disease and injury is maintained over time through a closed-loop, self-regulating control process. Thus, fluctuations in the degree of caution people apply in their behaviour determine the ups and downs in the loss to their health and safety. Moreover, the ups and downs in the amount of actual lifestyle-dependent loss determine the fluctuations in the amount of caution people exercise in their behaviour.

Finally, the third premise holds that the level of loss to life and health, in so far as this is due to human behaviour, can be decreased through interventions that are effective in reducing the level of risk people are willing to take—that is, not through measures of the “safe cigarette” variety or other such efforts towards a “technological fix” of the problem, but by means of programmes that enhance people’s desire to be alive and healthy.

The Risk Homeostasis Theory of Accident Causation and Prevention

Among the many psychological contributions to the literature on occupational accidents and disease, traffic accidents and lifestyle-dependent ill health, only a relatively few deal with motivational factors in the causation and the prevention of these problems. Most of the publications deal with variables such as permanent or semi-permanent traits (e.g., gender, personality or experience), transient states (fatigue, blood-alcohol level), information overload or underload (stress or boredom ), training and skills, environmental factors and workstation ergonomics. It may be reasoned, however, that all variables other than motivational ones (i.e., those impinging upon the target level of risk) merely have a marginal influence upon the frequency of accidents per operator-hour of task execution. Some, though, may well have a favourable effect upon the accident rate per unit of productivity or per unit distance of mobility.

When applied, for instance, to road traffic, RHT posits that the traffic accident rate per time unit of road-user exposure is the output of a closed-loop control process in which the target level of risk operates as the unique controlling variable. Thus, in contrast with temporary fluctuations, time-averaged accident risk is viewed as independent of factors such as the physical features of the vehicle and road environment and of operator skills. Instead, it ultimately depends on the level of accident risk accepted by the road-user population in exchange for the perceived benefits received from motor-vehicle mobility in general (like driving a lot), and from specific risky acts associated with that mobility in particular (like driving well in excess of the average speed).

Thus, it is reasoned that at any moment of time, vehicle operators, equipped with their perceptual skills, perceive a certain level of accident risk and they compare this with the amount of accident risk they are willing to accept. The level of the latter is determined by the pattern of trade-offs between expected costs and benefits associated with the available alternatives for action. Thus, the target level of risk is that level of risk at which the overall utility of manner and amount of mobility is thought to maximize. The expected costs and benefits are a function of economic, cultural and person-related variables, and their long-term, short-term and momentary fluctuations. These control the target level of risk at any specific moment of time.

Whenever road users perceive a discrepancy between target risk and experienced risk in one direction or the other, they will attempt to restore the balance through some behavioural adjustment. Whether the balance is achieved or not depends upon the individual’s decision-making and psychomotor skills. However, any action taken carries a certain likelihood of accident risk. The sum total of all actions taken by the road users in a jurisdiction in a given time period (like 1 year), produce the frequency and severity of the traffic accidents in that jurisdiction. It is hypothesized that this accident rate has an influence (through feedback) upon the level of accident risk perceived by the survivors and thus upon their subsequent actions and subsequent accidents, and so forth. Thus, as long as the target level of risk remains unchanged, accident toll and behavioural caution determine each other in a circular causal chain.

The Risk Homeostatic Process

This homeostatic process, in which the accident rate is both consequence and cause of changes in operator behaviour, is modelled in figure 1. The self-correcting nature of the homeostatic mechanism can be recognized in the closed loop that runs from box e to box b, to box c, to box d, and then back to box e. It may take some time for people to become aware of a change in the accident rate (the feedback may be delayed, and this is symbolized by f). Note that box a is located outside the closed loop, meaning that interventions that lower that target level of risk can bring about a lasting reduction in the accident rate (box e).

Figure 1. Homeostatic model relating changes in accident loss to changes in operator behaviour and vice versa, with the target level of risk as the controlling variable

The process described herein can be further and quite clearly explained by another example of homeostatic regulation: the thermostatic control of the temperature in a house. The set temperature (comparable to box a) on the thermostat is at any point in time being compared with the actual temperature (box b). Whenever there is a difference between the two, there is a need for adjustment (box c), which triggers an adjustment action (i.e., the provision of colder or warmer air, box d). As a result, the air that is distributed through the house becomes colder (via air conditioning) or warmer (via heating—box e), as desired. After some time (symbolized by f) the air at the new temperature reaches the point set on the thermostat and gives rise to a new temperature reading, which is compared with the set-point temperature (box a), and so on.

The house temperature will show major fluctuations if the thermometer is not very sensitive. The same thing will happen when the adjustment action is slow to set in, either due to inertia of the switching mechanism or to a limited capacity of the heating/cooling system. Note, however, that these deficiencies will not alter the time-averaged temperature in the house. Note too that the desired temperature (analogous to box a in figure 1) is the only factor outside the closed loop. Resetting the thermostat to a new target temperature will produce durable changes in the time-averaged temperature. Just as a person chooses a target level of risk on the basis of the perceived benefits and costs of safe and risky behaviour alternatives, so is the target temperature selected in consideration of the pattern of expected costs and benefits of higher or lower temperatures (e.g., energy expenditures and physical comfort). A lasting discrepancy between target risk and actual risk can occur only in the case of consistent over- or under-estimation of risk, just as a thermometer that produces a temperature reading that is consistently too high or too low will cause real temperature to deviate systematically from target temperature.

Evidence in Support of the Model

It may be deduced from the model described above that the introduction of any accident countermeasure that does not alter the target level of risk is followed by road users making an estimate of its intrinsic effect upon safety—that is, the change in accident rate that would occur if operator behaviour did not change in response to the new countermeasure. This estimate will enter into the comparison between perceived and accepted level of risk and thus influence subsequent adjustment behaviour. If the initial estimates are incorrect on average, a disturbance in the accident rate will occur, but only temporarily, because of the correcting effect due to the feedback process.

This phenomenon has been discussed in an OECD report. The greater opportunity for safety and the increased level of skill may not be utilized for greater safety, but instead for improved performance: “Behavioural adaptations of road users which may occur following the introduction of safety measures in the transport system are of particular concern to road authorities, regulatory bodies and motor vehicle manufacturers particularly in cases where such adaptations may decrease the expected safety benefit” (OECD 1990). This report mentions numerous examples, as follows:

Taxicabs in Germany equipped with anti-lock brake systems were not involved in fewer accidents than taxis without these brakes, and they were driven in a more careless manner. Increases in lane width of two-lane highways in New South Wales in Australia have been found to be associated with higher driving speeds: a speed increase by 3.2 km/h for every 30 cm additional lane width. This was found for passenger cars, while truck speed increased by about 2 km/h for every 30 cm in lane width. A US study dealing with the effects of lane-width reduction found that drivers familiar with the road reduced their speed by 4.6 km/h and those unfamiliar by 6.7 km/h. In Ontario it was found that speeds decreased by about 1.7 km/h for each 30 cm of reduction in lane width. Roads in Texas with paved shoulders as compared to unpaved shoulders were driven at speeds at least 10% higher. Drivers have generally been found to move at a higher speed when driving at night on roads with clearly painted edge markings.

Recently, a Finnish study investigated the effect of installing reflector posts along highways with an 80 km/h speed limit. Randomly selected road sections which totalled 548 km were equipped with these posts and compared with 586 km that were not. The installation of reflector posts increased speed in darkness. There was not even the slightest indication that it reduced the accident rate per km driven on these roads; if anything, the opposite happened (Kallberg 1992).

Numerous other examples could be mentioned. Seat-belt-wearing legislation has not been seen to reduce traffic fatality rates (Adams 1985). Habitual non-users of seat-belts who were made to buckle up, increased their moving speed and decreased their following distance (Janssen 1994). Following the change-over from left- to right-hand traffic in Sweden and Iceland, there were initially major reductions in the occurrence of serious accidents, but their rates returned to the pre-existing trend when road users found out that the roads had not become as dangerous as they thought at first (Wilde 1982). There have been major reductions in the accident rate per km driven in the course of this century, but the traffic accident rate per head of population has not shown a downward trend (when account is taken of periods of high unemployment in which the target level of accident risk is reduced; Wilde 1991).

Motivation for Accident Prevention

Interestingly, most of the evidence for the phenomena that are postulated by RHT comes from the area of road traffic, while the prospects this theory holds for accident prevention have largely been confirmed in occupational settings. In principle, there are four ways in which workers and drivers may be motivated to lower their target level of risk:

• Reduce the expected benefits of risky behaviour alternatives.

• Increase the expected costs of risky behaviour alternatives.

• Increase the expected benefits of safe behaviour alternatives.

• Decrease the expected costs of safe behaviour alternatives.

While some of these approaches have been found to be more effective than others, the notion that safety may be enhanced by acting upon motivation has a long history, as is obvious from the universal presence of punitive law.

Punishment

Although enforcement of punitive law is one of society’s traditional attempts at motivating people towards safety, the evidence for its effectiveness has not been forthcoming. It suffers from several other problems as well, some of which have been identified in the context of organizational psychology (Arnold 1989).

First is the “self-fulfilling prophecy” effect of attribution. For example, labelling people with undesirable characteristics may stimulate individuals to behave as if they had these characteristics. Treat people as if they were irresponsible and eventually some will behave as if they were.

Second, the emphasis is on process controls; i.e., on specific behaviours such as using a piece of safety equipment or obeying the speed limit, instead of focusing on the end result, which is safety. Process controls are cumbersome to design and implement, and they can never totally encompass all undesirable specific behaviours of all people at all times.

Third, punishment brings negative side-effects. Punishment creates a dysfunctional organizational climate, marked by resentment, uncooperativeness, antagonism and even sabotage. As a result, the very behaviour that was to be prevented may in fact be stimulated.

Encouragement

In contrast to punishment, incentive programmes have the effect for which they are intended, as well as the positive side-effect of creating a favourable social climate (Steers and Porter 1991). The effectiveness of incentives and recognition programmes in enhancing safety has been clearly established. In a recent review of over 120 published evaluations of different types of occupational accident prevention, incentives and recognition were generally found more effective towards safety than engineering improvements, personnel selection and other types of intervention which included disciplinary action, special licensing, and exercise and stress-reduction programmes (Guastello 1991).

Behavioural Adaptation

According to risk homeostasis theory, the accident rate per person-hour of task performance or the annual accident rate per head of population do not primarily depend upon a person’s ability to be safe, nor upon the opportunity to be safe, but instead upon that person’s desire to be safe. Thus, it is reasoned that, although education and engineering may provide the ability or the opportunity for greater safety, these approaches to accident prevention will fail to reduce the accident rate per hour, because they do not reduce the amount of risk people are willing to take. The response to these interventions, therefore, will usually take the form of some behavioural adjustment in which the potential safety advantage is in fact consumed as an addition to performance in terms of greater productivity, more mobility and/or higher speed of mobility.

This can be explained as the consequence of a homeostatic control process in which the degree of behavioural caution determines the accident rate and the accident rate determines the extent of caution in operator behaviour. In this closed-loop process, the target level of risk is the only independent variable that ultimately explains the accident rate. The target level of risk depends on the person’s perception of the advantages and disadvantages of various action alternatives. To maintain that safety is its own reward is to ignore the fact that people knowingly take risks for various contingencies that are open to modification.

Therefore, of all accident countermeasures that are currently available, those that enhance people’s motivation towards safety seem to be the most promising. Furthermore, of all countermeasures that affect people’s motivation towards safety, those that reward people for accident-free performance seem to be the most effective. According to McAfee and Winn’s literature review: “The major finding was that every study, without exception, found that incentives or feedback enhanced safety and/or reduced accidents in the workplace, at least in the short term. Few literature reviews find such consistent results” (1989).

Summary

Of all possible schemes that reward people for accident-free performance, some promise better results than others because they contain the elements that appear to enhance motivation towards safety. Examples of empirical evidence for the risk-homeostatic process have been selected from the larger information base (Wilde 1994), while the ingredients for effective incentive programming have been discussed in greater detail in Chapter 60.16. The under-reporting of accidents has been mentioned as the only identified negative side-effect of incentive schemes. This phenomenon, however, is limited to minor accidents. It may be possible to conceal a broken finger; it is more difficult to hide a corpse.

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